In this paper, we introduce a su¢ cient condition on the domain of admissible preferences of a social choice mechanism under which the properties of individual and coalitional strategyproofness are equivalent. Then, we illustrate the usefulness of this general result in the case where a …xed budget has to be allocated among several pure public goods.
Introduction
In social choice theory, we expect any collective decision within a group of individuals to re ‡ect the preferences of its members over the feasible social alternatives. Since any individual is allowed to express freely his/her preference, it is however necessary to specify which alternative will be selected for each conceivable pro…le of preferences. This mapping is called hereafter a social choice mechanism. From a normative viewpoint, the concept is well de…ned since, as long as preferences are the only individual characteristics which matter, the mechanism simply describes which alternative should be selected in any possible set of circumstances. From a positive viewpoint, the mapping is truly a composed mapping, as an institution is an object which can be far more complicated than a direct revelation mechanism. An institution is described by a set of rules leading, from the perspective of the analysis, to a normal form game. The key observation is that when we account for equilibrium behavior in the setting describing that institution, we end up with a set of social alternatives which only depends upon the pro…le of preferences. This means that under the presumption that this set is nonempty and does not contain several alternatives, we can look at the composed map (amalgating the institution and the equilibrium behavioral responses) as a social choice mechanism.
In the context of a social choice mechanism, the strategic choice of an agent consists in reporting his/her preferences over the alternatives. In this revelation game, like in any game, the ultimate e¤ect of his/her choice will depend upon his report together with the reports of the other individuals. There is no reason to assume that individuals will report the truth : if an agent can secure a better alternative by announcing preferences di¤erent from the truth, he/she may do so. These misreports can lead to a collective decision which has very little to do with the one based on true preferences and may turn out to be quite unsatisfactory.
It becomes therefore important to identify which social choice mechanisms are immuned to such manipulations.
In this paper, we will focus on two notions describing the resistance of a social choice mechanism to manipulations. The …rst one is strategyproofness which is a very strong form of robustness against "misbehavior". A social choice mechanism is strategyproof or individual strategyproof ( when we want to call the attention on the fact that only the behavior of individuals is taken into consideration) if telling the truth is a dominant strategy for every individual. This means that an individual does not need to solve the strategic uncertainty (attached, in principle to any game) to know what is his/her best strategy : no matter what the others do, a lie never pays out. This strong form of incentive compatibility is attractive but very demanding. In fact, an extremely dissapointing but fundamental result due to Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) states that if any preference can be reported, then only dictatorial mechanisms are strategyproof. In this paper, we are going to investigate the implication of strategyproofness for a class of environments where not every conceivable preference can be reported by an individual. We assume that an individual can report a preference from a prescribed subset of the all set of preferences, called the set of admissible preferences. Under that assumption of a restricted domain of preferences, the nihilist conclusion of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem may disappear in the sense that there exist non dictatorial strategyproof social choice mechanisms. In this paper, we consider this general setting : for some domain of admissible preferences, strategyproofness leads to a very narrow class of mechanisms while for some others, the class may contain very satisfactory mechanisms. We dont touch the di¢ cult and open question of characterizing the class of admissible domains of preferences leading to non dictatorial strategyproof social choice mechanisms.
The second notion of resistance to manipulation that we consider aims to incorporate the idea that besides individuals, groups (coalitions) of individuals may also play an active role, not captured by the notion of strategyproofness. Precisely, we want to consider a notion where the threats of coalitions are described and taken into consideration when designing the social choice mechanism. This calls for a precise de…nition of what a coalition can do if it forms 1 that its members cannot do on their own. This question is very controversial and before explaining the precise version that we will use here, it seems important to discuss brie ‡y some issues related to it. We may ask …rst if coalitions can proceed in monetary transfers and make binding agreements in which case the apparatus of cooperative game theory with side payments could be useful to de…ne the power of coalitions in contrast to individuals.
In this paper, we will consider social environments where social alternatives are public in nature and in particular such that no monetary transfers are involved. This precludes the use of this approach to de…ne coalitional behavior in our paper. Then, the unique role which is left to coalitions is to coordinate the reports of its members to attain a speci…c objective.
Without side payments, the objective cannot be the sum of the payo¤s of the members of the coalition and the all Pareto frontier has to ba taken into consideration. Precisely, the de…ni-tion of coalitional strategyproofness that we consider in this paper is the following. A social choice mechanism is coalitionally manipulable if for some pro…le of preferences, there exist a coalition such that when their members jointly misreport adequately their preferences, the mechanism selects an alternative that they all prefer to the one that would result all of them had reported their true preferences.A social choice mechanism is coalitional strategyproof if it is never coalitionally manipulable. This de…nition is the conventional 2 de…nition of coalitional strategyproofness used in the literature. From the perspective of the revelation game, it requires that the pro…le of truthful reports consitutes a strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann (1959) ). This is extremely demanding requirement as it is di¢ cult to guarantee existence of such equilibria. Note, in particular, that it implies that the pro…le is a Pareto e¢ cient Nash equilibrium; this means that a Nash (in fact, dominant strategy) equilibrium like the one in a prisonner dilemna setting is excluded. In contrast, in settings like "pure coordination games" where there are many Nash equilibria which are ordered alike by the individuals, strong Nash equilibrium acts as a selection device.
We think that this de…nition is the most demanding conceivable de…nition of robustness against deviations by coalitions. This means that if a social choice mechanism is coalitional strategyproof in that sense, it is coalitional strategyproof in any other reasonable sense. If instead, a social choice mechanism fails to be coalitional strategyproof in that sense, this negative conclusion should be examined with caution. In particular, we may wonder if all the coalitional threats should be treated equally. Suppose indeed, that a pro…table joint deviation by a coalition is identi…ed leading to the conclusion that the pro…le of reports fails to pass the equilibrium test. If it turns to be the case that in the reduced game ( the subset of players being the members of that coalition) some players or some subcoalitions of players …nd pro…table to further deviate from the deviation, then this may just deter the initial deviation on credibility grounds. This type of criticism gave rise to several alternative and less demanding concepts of Nash equilibrium robust to coalitional deviations, among which the concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987) ).
This concept is attractive because it is based on a consistent inductive de…nition of coalitional deviation but some other proposals have also been formulated. With such concept(s), there are, in principle, more coalitional strategyproof social choice mechanisms.
The main purpose of this paper is to study under which conditions the properties of (individual) strategyproofness and coalitional strategyproofness coincides. Strictly speaking, if a social choice mechanism is coalitional strategyproof then it is strategyproof but the converse does not need to hold true. Our main contribution is to identify a su¢ cient condition on the domain of admissible preferences for this equivalence to hold true. We call rich domains such domains. Note that when this equivalence holds true, then the above discussion about the appropriate de…nition of coalitional threats becomes irrelevant as any other concept is nested between these two ones. In the second part of the paper, we illustrate the power of this result through the examination of a speci…c allocation environment. It is important to point out that behind our equivalence result, there is no hidden result like "if a domain is rich, then a strategyproof social choice mechanism is dictatorial". Indeed, as we show in that part, there are rich domains admitting non dictatorial strategyproof social choice mechanisms.
Related Literature
This paper is at the intersection of two branches of the literature. On one hand, we study the role of the domain of admissible preferences on the properties of a social choice mechanism satisfying some other conditions. On the other hand, we are mostly interested by the de…nition and implications of coalitional incentive compatibility constraints in the design of a social choice mechanism.
We are not the …rst to pay attention to the role of the domain in the characterization of strategyproof social choice mechanisms. As the Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorem makes use of the universal domain condition, it was natural to investigate the responsability of that assumption in the derivation of the result. It was also useful since (besides voting) most environments of interest entail restricted preferences. This literature is nicely surveyed in Barbera (2001) and Sprumont (1995) . To the best of our knowledge, very few general principles have been established and the research has consisted mostly in the detailed study of the implications of strategyproofness in some classes of problems. It is worth mentionning few of these general results. Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979) have introduced a general domain richness condition that they use as a generalization of the universal domain condition in the formulation of many results in the theory of implementation. In a general class of allocation environments (covering the cases with private components), Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1997) have introduced the notion of strict monotonic closedness and demonstrate that for such domains, strategyproofness, non-bossiness 3 and equal treatment of equals imply no-envy. For the same class of domains, Moulin (1993) demonstrates that coalitional strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals imply also no-envy. He also notes that coalition strategyproofness could be replaced by Maskin monotonicity which, as noted by
Fleurbaey and Maniquet is a stronger requirement than strategyproofness and non-bossiness 3 WThis property was introduced by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) . We dont de…ne it precisely : it amounts to require that if by changing his report, an individual does not change his allocation, then he does not change the alocation of somebody else.
together, under the Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin richness condition. These domain richness conditions are logically unrelated to our richness domain condition. Given two pro…les satisfying some properties, these conditions ask for the existence of a third pro…le satisfying also some properties. In contrast, our condition asks that for any single pro…le satisfying some properties, there exists a second pro…le satisfying some properties.
We have already discussed some of the conceptual issues arising from the de…nition of coalitional incentive compatibility. The strong form considered here has been incorporated by many authors in axiomatic social choice. For instance, Moulin, in many (e.g. Moulin (1994), (1999)) of his works on axiomatic cost sharing, uses it as a key axiom. Of course, the question of coalitional incentive compatibility raises many challenging problems and have been formulated di¤erently by other authors. Within the general theory of implementation, Maskin (1979) shows that the set of social choice mechanisms which can be implemented in strong Nash equilibrium is much smaller that the set of those which are simply Nash implementable. With the weaker concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, Bernheim and 
De…nitions and Notations
In this section, we present the class of social choice environments which we consider and we introduce the main de…nitions and notations which are going to be used throughout this paper.
We are interested in a situation where a society (group) described by a …nite set N = f1; 2; ::::; ng of individuals must decide which alternative to select out of a set X of feasible alternatives. Each individual i 2 N is described by his/her preference R i over X, which is assumed to be a complete preorder. We will denote respectively by P i and I i the strict preference and the indi¤erence relations induced by R i . Sometimes, we will represent a preference R i by a utility function U i , but the reader should keep in mind that, in our framework, two utility functions representing the same preference will always be considered as equivalent. A pro…le of preferences is a vector (R 1 ; R 2 ; :::::; R n ) describing the preferences of each individual in the society. If is a pro…le of preferences and S N is a subset of individuals, then S denotes the subpro…le (R i ) i2S ; when S = N n fig for some i 2 N , we denote i for S . If and 0 are two pro…les of preferences and S N , then
denotes the pro…le such that
De…nition 1 Let be a subset of pro…les. A social choice mechanism with domain is a mapping C from into X. If consists of all possibles pro…les, the domain is said to be universal. Otherwise, it is said to be restricted. The notion of domain is central in our paper as the results are driven by assumptions which will be formulated on the domain. We will limit our investigation to
where for all i 2 N , D i is a subset of complete preorders over X. The social choice mechanism re ‡ects the aspirations and properties that this society wants to take into account to proceed in selecting a social alternative. The input of such mechanism is a pro…le of preferences. This means that once we know the diversity of opinions in the society, con ‡icts but also areas of agreement, we have, in principle, everything needed to pick up a compromise. To operate, the mechanism needs this input, but in most cases, this input is not known or veri…able with certainty by all members of the society. Confronted with this di¢ culty, we could then consider a broader class of social choice mechanisms where
set of messages or reports that can be sent by individual i. As every individual is ultimately interested by the social alternative that will be selected, such a mechanism together with the pro…le of preferences generates a normal form game among the individuals which are assumed to be rational players : for each individual i, the choice of the message m i to be sent, constitutes a strategic choice. Using the apparatus of game theory, we can predict the equilibrium behavior of the individuals and therefore the social outcome. In this paper, we focus on social choice mech-anisms admitting equilibria in dominant strategies i.e. such that, for all pro…le in the domain , each individual i has a dominant strategy. It is well known 5 that for such equilibrium concept, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to the class of social choice mechanisms introduced in de…nition 1 and to impose that the report of the truth is a dominant strategy for every individual in every possible circumstance.
De…nition 2
This property re ‡ects the necessity to provide incentives to individuals to make sure that they report the right information. Strategyproofness is a strong form of incentive compatibility as it requires the existence of dominant strategies. From the perspective of constructing the social choice mechanism, this property acts as a constraint in the design of the rule.
Some few more de…nitions and notations are needed. From now on, we limit our attention The following result which will be used in some proofs. Let :
be the range of the mechanism C.
Lemma 1 Let C be a strategyproof social choice mechanism with domain D. For all 2 D n and all
De…nition 3 A social choice mechanism C with domain is regular if C( ) X .
To the best of our knowledge, this property is new. It requires that the range of the mechanism is contained in the subset of alternatives which appear on the top of an admissible preference. It is certainly controversial in any environment where an alternative which could be considered as a good social compromise is disregarded simply because at best, it appears on second position in any indididual preference. In this paper, we will consider environments where the property of regularity does not raise any problem. The following simple lemma will be useful.
Lemma 2 Let C be a strategyproof and regular social choice mechanism with domain D. Then, C( ) = C ( ).
Proof : Since C ( ) C( ), we are left to prove that C( ) C ( ). Let x 2 C( ).
Since C is regular, x 2 X . Let 2 D n be such that R i 2 D x for all i 2 N . By lemma 1,
The property described in the following de…nition has been introduced by Barbera et Peleg (1990) . De…nition 5 A social choice mechanism C with domain is manipulable by coalition S at pro…le if there exists 0 2 such that C 0 S ; N nS P i C( ) for all . A social choice mechanism C with domain is coalitional strategyproof if there is no coalition S and no pro…le 2 such that C is manipulable by S at .
Coalitional strategy proofness is obviously more demanding than strategyproofness. It requires that there are no pro…table deviations from reporting the truth not only by individuals but also by groups of individuals. This property is very demanding as it does not impose to the deviating coalition to be credible. When a coalition S deviates, it is faced with a reduced game where the players are the members of S and it is natural to restrict 7 Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) have proved the equivalence of strategyproofness and strong positive association over the universal domain of complete orders. The modi…ed positive association property is neccesary but not su¢ cient in general for strategyproofness. Tanaka (2002) exhibits an association property which is both necessary and su¢ cient on the domain of continuous preferences? attention to patterns of plays which pass some equilibrium test in this reduced game. Besides pro…tability, coalitional strategyproofness does not include such type of restrictions. Doing so would lead to a less demanding notion of coalitional strategyproofness. So, in some sense, the notion considered here is the more demanding one within this class of notions and if a social choice mechanism veri…es that version, it veri…es any other property of coalitional strategyproofness that may be reasonably considered.
We conclude this section with an important notion that will be used in subsequent proofs and a technical lemma. Given a social choice mechanism C with domain D n , a pro…le 2 D n and a coalition S N , we denote by C S N nS the social choice mechanism de…ned over the subsociety S with domain D S by :
The range of the mechanism C S N nS will be denoted A S N nS : it describes the set of alternatives (options) attainable by coalition S given the subpro…le N nS of reports by individuals outside coalition S. These sets , called option sets by Barbera and Peleg (1990) 8 will play a critical role in the rest of the paper. For all i 2 N and 2 D n , the option set of
Lemma 4 Let X be a metric space and D be a subset of the set of continuous preferences over X . If C is a strategyproof social choice mechanism with domain D n then for all 2 D n and all S N , A S N nS \ X is a closed subset of X .
Proof : Let 2 D n , S N and x 2 X nA S N nS . We claim that there exists " > 0 such that :
Suppose on the contrary that for all " > 0, there exists z " 2 B(x; ") such that z " 2 R i for all i = 2 S R " for all i 2 f1; ::::::; jg R for all i 2 fj + 1; ::::::; sg Since C is strategyproof, we deduce : ; N nS ) = w = z " , we deduce from above and transitivity of R that yR z " , a contradiction to z " P y
Rich Domains
In the preceding section, we have introduced two notions of strategyproofness. Individual strategyproofness takes into consideration pro…table dishonest reports by individuals while coalitional strategyproofness extends the requirement to all coalitional dishonest joint reports. As already pointed out, the two notions are nested : coalitional strategyproofness is more demanding than strategyprofness. It is not di¢ cult to produce environments for which it is strictly more demanding. The purpose of this section is to identify a class of social environments for which the two notions coincide. Precisely, we introduce a condition on the domain D of preferences which is su¢ cient for this equivalence to hold true. This class of domains, that we call rich domains hereafter, is de…ned as follows.
De…nition 6 A domain
= D n is rich if for all R 2 D and x; y 2 X such that yP x and y 2 X , there exists R 0 2 D such that R 0 2 D y and for all z 6 = x such that xRz, we have xP 0 z.
To be rich, a domain must contain enough preferences. Of course, the universal domain is rich but there are also many restricted domains which meet this richness requirement.
Intuitively, when a domain is rich we are able to consider transformations of individual preferences where the positions of two given alternatives are improved in the process. Precisely the alternative y which was best among the two is now best among all and the other one x still strictly dominates the alternatives that it was strictly dominating before but now x also strictly dominates the alternatives belonging to its former indi¤erence curve. This is illustrated on …gures 1 and 2 in the case where alternatives are vectors in the two dimensional Euclidean space. On …gure 1, we have drawn the upper contour sets of x and y for It should be transparent from this illustration that for a domain to be rich, we must have enough degrees of freedom to deform preferences. If not, the richness condition is likely to be violated. Consider for instance the traditionnal Euclidean environment popular in formal political science i.e. the setting where X is some Euclidean space < m and D is the subset of Euclidean preferences : a preference R over X is Euclidean if there exists p 2 < m such that xRy i¤ k x p k k y p k. The upper contours sets are the spheres centered on p. The set of Euclidean preferences is not rich. To see why, consider the case where m = 2. On …gure 3, we have drawn the upper contour set of x with y inside but di¤erent from p. As we can see immediately, necessarily, the circle centered on y and containing x; has points outside the …rst disk.
We will see two important examples of rich domains in the next section. Besides these environments, we can also prove 9 that the set of continuous preferences over a metric space considered by Barbera and Peleg (1990) is rich. However, it is important to call the attention on the fact that there are general properties of preferences which preclude the richness 9 A proof is available upon request from the authors. does not belong to the rectangle generated by x and p and that z belongs to the rectangle generated by x and y. This is illustrated on …gure 4 below. From the de…nition of D, it follows that any preference R 0 2 D such that y is on top for R 0 implies that any alternatives w in the rectangle generated by x and y is prefered to x according to R 0 . In particular, we have zR 0 x.
Our main result on rich domains is the following.
Theorem 1 Let C be a social choice mechanism with domain = D n . If D is rich, then C is strategyproof if and only C is coalitional strategyproof.
Proof : Let C be a strategyproof social choice mechanism on a domain D n assumed to 10 Intuitively, a preference over a product space is separable if preferences over each factor of the product are de…ned without ambiguity. Such well de…ned projections are then called marginal preferences.
11 A similar conclusion holds true for the domain of continuous and separable preferences considered by Le Breton and Weymark (1999). be rich. We now prove that C is coalitional strategyproof. assume on the contrary that C is not coalitional strategyproof. Then, there exists S N and ; 0 2 D n such that for all i 2 S :
Given the construction of 00 and since C( ) = y, a repeated application of lemma 3 leads to :
On the other hand, note that since C is strategyproof, the restricted social choice mech-
While less important, there are also some other implications of the richness condition that we would like to report as they will be used as auxilliary results in the next section.
De…nition 7 A social choice mechanism C with domain D n is dictatorial if there exists an individual i 2 N such that for all 2 D n and all x; y 2 C( ), if xP i y, then C( ) 6 = y.
A dictatorial social choice mechanism ignores the preferences of all but one individual : the most prefered alternative of this individual, called the dictator, is selected to be the social outcome.
Lemma 5 Let C be a regular social choice mechanism with domain = D n . If D is rich, then C is dictatorial if and only C is dictatorial.
Proof : Assume that C is dictatorial and let us prove that C is dictatorial too. Let i be the dictator for C and assume on the contrary that i is not a dictator for C. A repeated application of lemma 3 leads to C( 0 ) = x. But, on the other hand, since
and i is a dictator for C , we deduce that C( 0 ) = y in contradiction to the earlier statement
Applications
The main purpose of this section is to illustrate the usefulness of theorem 1 though a detailed examination of a speci…c 12 but important environment. When a domain of preferences is rich, the analysis of the implications of strategyproofness in the construction of social choice mechanisms is considerably simpli…ed as we know that the mechanism is in fact coalitional strategyproof. Note in particular that if a mechanism C is coalitional strategyproof, then it is Pareto e¢ cient over the range C( ) i.e. there does not exist 2 and x 2 C( ) :
Since Pareto E¢ ciency put some constraints on the subset of social outcomes that may be considered, this information can be exploited to simplify the analysis of the mechanism C.
Allocation of a Budget Across Several Di¤erent Pure Public Goods
The allocation environment considered in this section has been examined …rst by Zhou (1991) and is de…ned as follows. An exogeneous monetary budget of size normalized to 1 is to be allocated across m di¤erent pure public goods. The set X of alternatives is therefore the unitary m-dimensional simplex :
We assume that each individual i 2 N has a preference over the m-dimensional positive orthant < m + which is assumed to be strictly monotonic and strictly convex. The set D is the set of restrictions of such preferences to the set X. It is straightforward to show that a preference R is in D i¤ its upper contour sets are strictly convex. Theorem 3 stated below holds true for all n and all m 3 but for the sake of simplicity, we will limit our investigation to the case where m = 3 and n = 2. The case where m = 2 is considered in the next subsection.
Lemma 6 Let m = 3 and n = 2. Then the set of preferences D of preferences with strictly convex upper contour sets is rich.
Proof : Let R be a preference in D such that yP x for some x; y 2 X. Let A be the upper contour set of x with respect to R i.e. A = fz 2 X : zRxg A is a closed and strictly convex subset of X with y 2 Interior A. Let A 0 be a closed and strictly convex subset of A such that y 2 Interior A 0 and Boundary A\ Boundary A 0 = fxg.
The construction of such subset is illustrated on …gure 5.
Let J be the jauge of (A 0 fyg) with respect to y i.e. the function de…ned by :
It is well known 13 that J is a continuous and convex (here strictly convex) function such that :
Let R 0 be the preference generated by J. By construction, R 0 2 D y and for all z 6 = x, xRz implies xP 0 z Lemma 7 Let m = 3 and n = 2. Let C be a strategyproof social choice mechanism over D such that C(D n ) = X. Then, for all x 2 X and all 13 See e.g. Rockafellar (1970) . Proceeding as in the proof of lemma 6, let H be de…ned over X as the jauge of S with respect to z and R 2 be the preference generated by H. We deduce that R 2 is strictly convex.
Further, z is the unique best element and the boundary of S is the indi¤erence curve going through x. Since, by assumption,
Since C is strategyproof, we deduce therefore that :
Now, let B be the set 14 of best alternatives of R 2 over A 2 (R 0 1 ). By construction of B(z; "), B \ B(z; ") = ?. Also, by construction of S and since x 2 A 2 (R 0 1 ) : B S. Further, since C is strategyproof, we deduce therefore that there exist b 2 B such that : 14 Since the set A 2 (R 0 1 ) is compact, the set B is nonempty. Note however, that,since A 2 (R 0 1 ) is not necessarily convex, the set B may contain more than one alternative.
From the construction of S and the position of b in S, we deduce from the strict convexity of R 1 that bP 1 z. Comparing (2) and (3), this implies then that C is manipulable by individual 1 at the pro…le = (R 1 ; R 2 ) in contradiction to our assumption that C is strategyproof
We are now in position to prove the main result of this section. To proceed, we will use a result proved by Bordes, La¤ond and le Breton (1990) 
Theorem 3 Let m = 3 and n = 2. Let C be a strategyproof social choice mechanism over D such that C(D n ) = X. Then, C is dictatorial.
Proof : From lemma 7, D is rich and therefore, from theorem 1, C is coalitional strategyproof. Let b C be the restriction of C to b D n . Then, b C is also coalitional strategyproof. We deduce from theorem 2 that b C is dictatorial. Without loss of generality, let individual 1 be the dictator for b C. We now prove that 1 is also a dictator for C. This is equivalent to show that for all 2 D 2 , the option set A 2 (R 1 ) is equal to the unique best element of R 1 .
Let :
) where x 1 denotes both the best alternative for R 1 and the Euclidean preference with ideal point R 1 . By combining both claims, we obtain that :
But, since 1 is a dictator for C, b A 2 (x 1 ) = fx 1 g and the conclusion follows Theorem 3 can be extended to domains larger than D. Since here X = X, any social choice mechanism is trivially regular. Therefore from lemma 4, we deduce that C is dictatorial i¤ C is dictatorial. Therefore, it is enough to prove that C is dictatorial. A careful examination of the proof of lemma 6, shows that we dont exploit the full force of the strict convexity of R 1 : What is truly needed is the strict monotonicity along any half-line with the best alternative x 1 as origin. This implies that any domain e D such that e D is contained in this subset of convex preferences leads to the same conclusion.
The structure of the proof of theorem 3 is quite instructive. Once we know that the social choice mechanism C is coalitional strategyproof, we can exploit the simple fact that any restriction of C to a subdomain is also coalitional strategyproof. On these subdomains, the geometry of the Pareto set is sometimes easy to derive. For instance, in the case where the subdomain consists of the subset of Euclidean preferences, the Pareto set is the convex hull of the ideal points of the two individuals. The proof of theorem 2 based on the technique of option sets uses this property.
Once we know what happens on a subdomain, it remains of course to extend the result to the all domain. The key step 15 , which corresponds here to lemma 7, is a "top only" property asserting that strategyproofness implies that only the top alternatives of the two individuals matter in calculating the social outcome.
Theorem 3 is a slightly weaker version of an impossibility result established for this environment by Zhou (1991) . His setting is identical to the one considered here but instead of us, Zhou does not assume that the range of the mechanism C coincides with X and demonstrates his result under the weaker assumption that the range of C is two dimensional.
It is straightforward to see that the conclusion of theorem 3 holds true for the social environment where X = < 2 + and D is the set of preferences with compact and strictly convex upper contour sets. However, this conclusion does not hold true for the domain b D. In fact, as demonstrated by Le Breton and Sen (1999) when a domain D consists of separable preferences over a product set, strategyproofness implies decomposability. The class of decomposable strategyproof social choice mechanisms contains non dictatorial mechnisms.
However, these mechanisms are not Pareto e¢ cient. If we insist on Pareto e¢ ciency, then the class of strategyproof social choice mechanisms collapses on dictatorial mechanisms.
Single Peakedness
Theorem 3 was derived under the assumption that there are at least three di¤erent public goods. When there are only two public goods, the set X is an interval. A preference in D over that interval is single peaked. We know that for this social environment there are many non dictatorial strategyproof social choice mechanisms, on top of which the so called median mechanism. The general family of strategyproof social choice mechanisms has been characterized by Moulin (1980) . The domain D is rich and a shorter proof of the characterization result exploiting theorem 1 could be provided. But more importantly, this setting is interesting as it ilustrates the fact that there are domains where individual and coalitional strategyproofness are equivalent without being equivalent to dictatoriality.
